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ABSTRACT 
Ionospheric Neutron Content Analyzer (INCA), a student led CubeSat project at New Mexico State University 
(NMSU). INCA is launching on NASA’s ELaNa 20 mission carrying a neutron detector designed and built by 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. The INCA mission is the first spacecraft built by New Mexico State 
University in many years, as such, the program was essentially started from scratch with minimal pre-existing 
resources. While eventually successful, INCA took many missteps along the way, starting out as a 6U, eventually 
being completely redesigned to a 3U, before launching after around six years of development. This paper documents 
INCA’s design, build, and early operations, along the way the team learned many lessons about designing and 
building a small satellite in the context of a university program. This paper is targeted at new university teams 
considering starting a mission, documenting best practices learned by the INCA team, and some pitfalls to avoid.	
INTRODUCTION	
The Ionospheric Neutron Content Analyzer (INCA) is a 
3U student mission led by New Mexico State 
University (NMSU). While this is not the first SmallSat 
built by NMSU, the previous efforts occurred several 
years prior to the INCA mission, with everyone 
including the faculty who worked on previous missions 
have left NMSU. As such the INCA mission is being 
conducted by an all-new team which had essentially no 
prior experience with SmallSats.  
 
Figure 1: INCA undergoing final testing 
This paper is intended to document the mistakes and 
lessons learned by the INCA team with the hope that 
future missions will be able to learn from NMSU’s 
mistakes. While the INCA mission has had significant 
challenges, the mission is now essentially complete and 
is manifested on the upcoming ELaNa 20 launch. The 
INCA mission is a partnership with NASA Goddard, 
where NMSU built the spacecraft, and Goddard 
provided the science instrument.	
INCA MISSION	
Science Mission 
	
Figure 2: Interior of the Neutron Detector including 
the mount for the two scintillators 
The INCA CubeSat is flying a Silicon Photomultiplier 
(SiPM) based Neutron Detector. This Neutron detector 
will for the first time measure the time and latitude 
dependence of the Neutron Spectrum in Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO). The Neutron detector, which was built by 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, and is based 
around two cylindrical P-Terphenyl Scintillators. These 
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scintillators generate photons when hit by energetic 
particles such as neutrons. The photons are then read 
out by an array of SiPMs, which convert the them into 
an electronic signal. The two main scintillators are 
enclosed in a box of veto panels, which only react to 
charged particles and not neutral particles, therefore 
making it possible to reject charged particles. This is 
necessary, as the main detector cannot distinguish 
between charged and neutral particles. The Neutron 
detector determines the energy of a particle by 
measuring the time of flight between when a neutron 
strikes each of the two scintillators. 
INCA’s science objective is to measure the neutron flux 
in LEO, which feeds into models of the formation of 
Earth’s magnetic field. Additionally, these 
measurements contribute to understanding the radiation 
environment that satellites encounter, and to the 
understanding of neutron air showers, which pose a 
radiation hazard to occupants of high-altitude aircraft 
such as airliners.	
Software Design	
INCA utilizes a multi-processor architecture, with the 
main system board being controlled by a low-power 
ARM processor, and the neutron detector controlled by 
a BeagleBone Black. This architecture allows the 
payload to communicate with the BeagleBone Black 
via a USB network protocol, utilizing the processing 
power of the high-power consumption BeagleBone 
Black only during science collection. Off-board INCA, 
the ground station computer is used to communicate 
with the satellite. The communication between these 
computers is a master-minion tree, where the ground 
station computer is the master of the system board on 
the satellite. Onboard the satellite, the system board is 
the master of the BeagleBone Black. The master 
controls the communication link, with the minion only 
responding when requested by the master. This is 
critical for the half-duplex communication link between 
the ground and the satellite in order to ensure 
commands can always be sent to the satellite.	
The main-system board software uses a single 
executable structure to reduce complexities of inter-
process communication. This is effective in reducing 
complexity but increases the risk of changing onboard 
software during flight, as the entire flight code must be 
re-uploaded to perform this procedure. 
Hardware Design	
The hardware for INCA is based on an off the shelf 
CubeSat system, which includes a 3U hard anodized 
aluminum structure, flight computer, battery, and a -Z 
panel with integrated antennas for a GPS and radio. 
Additionally, the system included side panels that cover 
the first 1U of the 3U structure. These panels contain 3-
axis open core magnetorquers. The INCA team 
purchased a GPS, which integrates into the COTS flight 
computer and the included antenna on the -Z panel. 
Sensors integrated with the commercial system include 
sun sensors, temperature sensors, and magnetometers 
on the outer panels. The rest of the hardware consists of 
a BeagleBone Black and a Globalstar radio. The rest of 
the components were custom manufactured by the 
INCA team and not COTS parts.  
Thermal analysis showed that some of the materials in 
the neutron detector would get too hot and lose their 
useful properties, so a copper heat sink with a mylar 
sheet facing the front of the satellite was included 
between the sun sensor on the front face and the front 
of the detector. NMSU made a custom PCB to mount 
the BeagleBone Black and Globalstar radio to the 
structure. Additionally, this board contained the 
circuitry required to connecting the detector to the 
BeagleBone and the flight computer. Providing power 
to the satellite, are a set of custom deployable and side 
solar panels. These panels included temperature sensors 
for a better understanding of the spacecrafts thermal 
state, and the circuitry for the deployment mechanism. 
Due to the accuracy required to achieve some of the 
mission objectives, a custom directionally sensitive sun 
sensor was required on the front face to accurately 
determine the attitude of the satellite with respect to the 
sun, as such a custom sensor was designed and 
fabricated to achieve this sensitivity. 
 
Figure 3: INCA with the solar panels deployed 
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INCA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE	
UNP days	
The INCA mission started as a 6U CubeSat in 2012 as 
part of the University Nanosat Program (UNP) in their 
NS-8 competition. INCA remained in the UNP program 
until the end of phase A, at which point the UNP 
program down selected from ten missions to five. 
INCA was down selected from the UNP program, 
primarily due to lack of design maturity at the time. The 
UNP project provided the INCA team with a strong 
foundation in developing the initial mission.	
Converting to 3U	
As the mission was fundamentally sound, merely 
behind schedule, and much of the UNP funding was 
still available, it was decided to continue development, 
even after the INCA mission was down selected from 
the UNP process. However, without the UNP programs 
support, obtaining a launch became significantly more 
challenging. It was quickly identified that launch 
opportunities for 6U’s where few and far between. 
After careful analysis of INCA’s design, it was 
determined by sacrificing a small amount of resolution 
in the neutron detector, it would be possible to shorten 
the detector, and shrink INCA into a 3U CubeSat. This 
decision substantially opened up launch opportunities, 
and eventually resulted in a launch slot through 
NASA’s CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI).	
Launch Selection	
Due to a low budget once INCA lost continued UNP 
funding, it was necessary to find a low-cost launch 
option. As such, INCA applied to NASA’s CSLI 
program. This competitive program launches CubeSat 
payloads from any US educational institution with a no 
transfer of funds agreement. The INCA program 
proposed to the CSLI program for the first time in 
November 2014, as a 6U CubeSat. This proposal was 
not selected, so the INCA team converted the mission 
into a 3U and reapplied in November 2015. In February 
2016 the INCA team was notified that it had been 
selected for the CSLI program and a few weeks later it 
was announced that INCA was manifested for launch 
on the ELaNa 20 mission onboard Virgin Galactic’s 
LauncherOne. This was a unique launch opportunity in 
that there was no primary payload, and the only other 
payloads where other ELaNa CubeSats. 
3U Development	
The COTS CubeSat system purchased by the INCA 
team included most of the major systems. These 
components fit together relatively well with minimal 
modifications. A CAD model of the satellite with all of 
the components included was used to determine how 
the spacecraft would fit together. The external 
components were fabricated first because the design of 
these would not be altered by any changes in the design 
of the detector. These external components included the 
front sun sensor, the deployable solar panels, and the 
side panels for the 2U of the structure not covered by 
the COTS side panels.  
The detector took multiple iterations to finalize the 
design; though the external dimensions did not vary too 
greatly between iterations because the team had already 
identified how much space the rest of the avionics stack 
would take. Once the detector design was finalized, the 
structural parts were manufactured at NMSU in the on-
campus machine shop. The completed detector 
structural components were then sent to NASA 
Goddard where the rest of the components were 
assembled into the detector structure. Upon receiving 
the completed detector at NMSU, a test fit into the 
spacecraft structure revealed that the detector was 0.5 
mm too large in every dimension, which prevented the 
spacecraft from being assembled around the detector. 
The detector was too big as a result to the thickness of a 
Teflon wrap around the veto panels, which were not 
properly accounted for in the detector design. To deal 
with this issue, the detector was sent back to Goddard 
for modification. This is a good example of why 
prototypes of all components should be made as early 
as possible to prevent these issues from occurring at the 
last minute. Once the detector was integrated into the 
structure and the final position and dimensions 
determined, the custom board to mount the BeagleBone 
Black and the Globalstar radio were designed. This 
board needed to include a hole to clear part of the 
wiring harness for the detector. The CAD model was 
used to figure out the final position the BeagleBone 
would be mounted in and the mounting PCBs were 
ordered. After fully assembling one of these boards and 
installing it into the structure, everything appeared to fit 
correctly until the coax connector was installed on the 
radio. The connector stuck out roughly 8 mm beyond 
the side of the radio and was found to interfere with the 
side panel, which would have resulted in the external 
dimensions exceeding the size of the deployment 
canister. A redesign of the board was required which 
shifted the Beagleone and radio over enough to allow 
for the length of the stack from one side of the 
BeagleBone to the coax connector on the other side to 
fit within the side panels. Even with this change, a USB 
connector that would not be used on the BeagleBone 
had to be removed because it protruded too far past the 
edge of the board and the end of the coax connector had 
to be filed down to avoid contacting the side panel.  
A challenge the INCA team faced was a poor decision 
made early on to try to make a UNP deadline, this 
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resulted in hardware being selected that was not 
designed for the purpose. A system suite was selected, 
that was designed for a 1U satellite, and the INCA team 
added various boards to the encompassing suite to make 
it work with the additional solar panels, and the neutron 
detector. This solution worked but resulted in undesired 
issues. One of the issues required completely replacing 
the COTS interface board with a custom board to 
permit integration between CubeSat kit, and the rest of 
the system. This board design was complex and would 
not have been needed with better early system 
engineering.	
LESSONS LEARNED	
Program Management	
The INCA mission learned a great deal of tips and 
tricks to improve the mission programmatically. The 
first major issue encountered was schedule delays. The 
mission ran significantly behind for most of the design 
and manufacturing process. Some of this was due to 
issues beyond the team’s control, such as the teams 
initial funding being delayed for several months due to 
an extended government shutdown. However, most of 
the delay was due to inadequate internal programmatic 
designs. One of the biggest problems encountered by 
the INCA team was an underestimate of how long these 
projects would take. When working to a deadline that is 
years away, it is very difficult to apply the appropriate 
pressure on students to make progress on systems, 
particularly when they also have class work. One of the 
techniques that the INCA team found worked well was 
to create intermediate deadlines with real penalties if 
they were not met. What the INCA team recommends is 
creating a regular review schedule, with reviews at least 
twice a year. These reviews should have clearly defined 
expectations of where the systems should be at that 
point. This provides team members with clear and 
imminent deadlines along with the consequence of 
having to present to reviewers why they are not on 
schedule.	
Another important aspect of program management that 
the INCA team recommends, is too create a series of 
tests which sub teams are expected to perform on a 
specific schedule. On the INCA mission, the test 
program was developed around doing the final system 
level tests once the mission was nearly complete and 
the systems where all integrated. This resulted in 
problems with individual systems not being identified 
until very late in the design process. This included 
determining that the team needed to re-spin a couple of 
custom electronic boards after they had already been 
integrated. The second problem this caused is that the 
team didn’t do much work with the flight hardware 
until the system tests. This resulted in the team being 
generally unfamiliar with how to use the systems until 
late in the testing process, significantly slowing final 
development. To fix these, the recommended solution is 
to develop a series of simple tests, to be completed 
early on. These are steps like demonstrating power on, 
demonstrating two components can communicate with 
each other, or charging a battery. The important part is 
that these tests are measurable and can be performed 
progressively throughout the development cycle. These 
tests should be done with both prototype, and flight 
hardware.	
Personnel 	
The biggest challenges encountered on the INCA 
project was the high turnover rate of undergraduate 
students. The INCA mission took over six years 
between inception, and launch. With the exception of 
the faculty PI, no one involved with the beginning of 
the project is currently involved. The long timeframes 
involved relative to the duration of a single student 
involvement necessitates that any university CubeSat 
project have a well-defined recruitment plan. The 
strategy the INCA team eventually came up with is to 
establish a team lead, and a co-team lead for each sub 
system. The co-team lead should be at least a year 
behind the team lead, so as to take over once the team 
lead graduates. 	
It is important to regularly recruit new students so as to 
ensure that there is always a pool of students to pull 
from as people graduate off the team. The INCA team 
found that the best recruiting method was to target 
students at approximately the sophomore or second 
semester freshmen level, this gave the team time for 
older students to train these students before they 
graduated. Additionally, it was found to be crucial to 
recruit the students before they became involved with 
other projects. It is also important to not overlook the 
value of graduate students, particularly if it can be 
arranged for the SmallSat project to be part of their 
graduate research. What the INCA team found is that in 
several important areas, namely communication 
systems, attitude determination and control, vibration 
analysis embedded systems, and thermal analysis. 
Undergraduates don’t learn what they need to know to 
perform the work in these fields until the very end of 
their program. As such, the INCA team repeatedly 
found that students would learn enough to start these 
analyses in their final semesters and would not leave 
them with sufficient time to complete the work before 
they left. In order to perform analysis in these area’s it 
is recommended to either have graduate students 
available to perform the work, or to arrange for an 
expert like a professor to be available to guide lower 
level undergraduates through these tasks. If all else 
fails, it is useful to arrange for funds to be available to 
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hire an outside consultant to aid with these crucial 
tasks. This was not done on the INCA project, but 
probably should have been.	
One final aspect to personnel that NMSU found very 
important to recruiting useful students was to pay them. 
It is not necessarily crucial to pay all of the students, 
however the INCA team found that volunteer students 
usually had to get a job in order to pay for school, 
which significantly impacted the hours they could put 
into INCA. The simple fact of the matter is that the 
amount of time that is required to be put into 
developing a SmallSat is more than most students can 
put in while also working and attending school full 
time.	
Software	
The largest pitfall for INCA’s software development 
was manpower. As INCA is a student project, most of 
the workers were volunteers with only a few paid 
research assistants. This led to a shortage of workers at 
times and caused the main flight software team to 
merge with the Communication sub-team. Although 
these teams needed to work closely to get the 
communication software to work with the rest of the 
satellite flight software, this decision put strain on the 
small workforce of one to three students working on the 
software at the time. Additionally, the software 
developers wound up spending precious man-hours on 
the design, of an interface board. Future missions 
should ensure there is adequate manpower being 
devoted to both hardware design and software design.	
COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF	
INCA was developed with predominantly Commercial 
Off the Shelf (COTS) components. This was a sound 
decision for an inexperienced spacecraft team. 
However, the team did learn several important lessons 
about working with these types of components which 
should be considered. The first is that SmallSat COTS 
parts are not off the shelf in the sense that consumer 
electronics are off the shelf. SmallSat COTS parts are 
produced in small lots, and they should be tested nearly 
as rigorously as with custom components. However, the 
difference is that COTS parts will tend to pass their 
testing on the first attempt, something that is often not 
the case with custom components.	
A second major recommendation the INCA team has 
for working with COTS components is to thoroughly 
vet the manufactures before purchasing components 
from them. When you develop a spacecraft, your 
component manufactures essentially become a partner 
on the mission and needs to act as such. The INCA 
team found several manufactures that were excellent to 
work with, producing high quality components that 
where extremely well documented, and included 
excellent customer support. INCA did purchase one 
major component from a company with a very good 
sales department. However, once the component was 
purchased, the company failed to provide useful 
documentation, or the required software libraries. This 
company then proceeded to provide poor support for 
their product for a few years until they finally told the 
INCA team that the support contract had expired. At 
this point the manufacture had still failed to provide all 
of the software that was supposed to be part of the 
original product. It was later discovered that this was a 
common problem with this particular manufacturer. 
The moral of this story is that like most industries, the 
SmallSat community has many suppliers who are very 
good; there are also several that are not; use caution 
when choosing who to work with.	
WORKING WITH A PARTNER	
Since NASA Goddard developed the payload for the 
INCA mission, the INCA team was able to experience 
both the challenges and the rewards of working with a 
partner on a space mission. The layout of the INCA 
partnership was that Goddard developed and supplied 
the instrument, which was then delivered to NMSU to 
integrate into the spacecraft. This arrangement worked 
well, with Goddard providing an instrument that NMSU 
could never have developed by itself. However, there 
were several mistakes made in this partnership. Such as 
it was never clearly delineated what parts where 
Goddard’s responsibility, and which parts where 
NMSU’s. This resulted in a few problems, one example 
was that late in the process, it was discovered that both 
groups had believed that the cable, which connected the 
neutron detector to the spacecraft bus, was being built 
and had been purchased by the other group. This cable 
included a high cost long lead-time connector which 
nearly resulted in INCA missing its vibe test. 
Fortunately, Goddard found a connector that had been 
purchased as a spare for another mission.  
A second but closely related problem in the 
development was the lack of a clear Interface Control 
Document (ICD) between the detector and the 
spacecraft bus. The INCA team strongly recommends 
creating and maintaining an ICD with the partner. This 
document needs to clearly define the mechanical 
connection between systems, including both the 
structural connection and electrical connections. 
Additionally, the ICD needs to contain protocol 
information about how the software communicates. The 
INCA team did not have this document, and it resulted 
in a significant delay in the design as each time anyone 
wanted to work on those parts, it become necessary to 
schedule a meeting to determine the interface. This 
process also resulted in a good deal of redesign, as 
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without a clear document more than once the two teams 
misunderstood the other, and the two groups designed 
conflicting parts. One particularly notable incident 
involved Goddard placing a wiring harness on the 
outside of the neutron detector which occupied the 
same location as one of INCA’s avionics boards. This 
necessitated a redesign of the avionics board with a 
hole in the middle to accommodate the neutron 
detectors wiring harness.  
One final comment on partnerships, is to ensure that 
both parties understand the others financial situation. 
Goddard built INCA’s Neutron Detector as a spare time 
project with parts scavenged from other projects. In the 
end this worked out, but required NMSU to purchase 
parts, and to manufacture the neutron detectors 
structure. This arrangement worked but could have 
turned into a significant problem if both sides had not 
understood the arrangement. Overall the key to working 
with Goddard successfully boiled down to 
communication. It helped significantly to have a couple 
of in person meetings between the two teams which 
helped establish a rapport to enable future 
communications to go more smoothly. However, the 
most important element which significantly improved 
the two teams progress was the establishment of a 
weekly meeting between the key people on both teams. 
This meeting includes the engineers and scientists 
doing the work, and not just management. 
 
Figure 4: The Completed INCA CubeSat 
 
CONCLUSION	
In conclusion, the INCA mission has been very 
successful with over one hundred students working on 
it over its six-year design life. There have been 
numerous lessons learned, however they fundamentally 
boil down to three main points, first test early and often, 
second communication is key, and third create well 
documented processes early, keep them updated and 
follow them.	
 
 
